Introduction
Since 2004, to avoid the intrusion of terrorists via crossing the border, many countries have started issuing e-Passports to the citizens. e-Passport contains RFID tags [1] which are used to store data, process the information on low cost and transmit the information via wireless communication. It also integrates with face biometrics to control user authentication.
In 2005, first generation e-Passport was developed using International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards to identify the persons with face biometrics while crossing borders. In the year 2006, Extended Access Control (EAC) [2] mechanism was suggested by the European Union, to eliminate the security problems encountered in the first generation. To enhance the security it promotes additional biometrics like fingerprint and iris. Eavesdropping, cloning of a chip and retrieval of key are the problems encountered in these conventional standards.
In 2008, P a s u p a t h i n a t h a n, P i e p r z y k and W a n g [3] recommended a novel method for Australian e-Passport namely On-line Secure e-Passport Protocol (OSEP). In this method there is a chance of selecting same key values by the two travelers. In 2009, M o h a m e d A b i d and H o s s a m A f i f i [4] suggested a new solution based on elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman agreement protocol. As per the author's idea, an elliptic curve is based on selecting continuous 32 minutiae points from the fingerprint of the e-Passport holder. Since the fingerprint biometric is easily contaminated by noise, selecting continuous 32 same minutiae points at the receiver side may not be possible. Hence in the proposed technique to eliminate the above problems a new session key agreement protocol using Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) which uses the data derived from iris signature is suggested. By using the biometric features, the proposed system provides strong user authentication and by using ECC the proposed scheme provides stronger session key agreement function [5] .
Contribution of the paper
Protection of data and network security has been greatly researched. Enhance the security with best performance is mandatory in the case of border control applications like e-Passport. Several exiting protocols have failed to satisfy the security properties and performance accuracy. Hence in the proposed method conventional cryptographic concepts are integrated with biometrics. In the method being proposed, security enhanced mechanism based on variation of Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol using ECC between e-Passport and the Examination System (ES) was implemented. The elliptic curve parameters A, B and G are derived from iris code. From these parameters public key of e-Passport and session key between e-Passport and ES is generated. The formal security of the proposed protocol was verified using ProVerif tool. This article also demonstrates the efficiency comparison of the proposed protocol based on the parameters like Mutual authentication between client and server, Key agreement, Certificate Comparison, Computational cost and communication cost with other existing protocols. The efficiency comparison shows that the proposed one and Yang & Chang et al. protocol have the same performance metrics. Hence further analysis of proposed one with Yang & Chang et al. was done based on the security properties like Prevention of Guessing attack, Prevention of replay attack, session key security and Forward security. The comparative analysis highlights that the proposed protocol is light weight, robust with efficient and it is perfectly suitable for real-time biometric based authenticated applications.
Outline of the paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 shows the background of the elliptic curve cryptography. In Section 3 the various phases of the proposed protocol is discussed. In Section 4 the intended security properties of proposed protocol is verified using the ProVerif tool. In the same section the efficiency performance and security properties of proposed protocol is compared with the existing one. At the end, Section 5 concludes the paper.
Background of elliptic curve cryptography
In this section, the basics of elliptic curves over finite fields and principles of Elliptic curve cryptography is outlined in a few words.
Elliptic curve group operation over GF(p)
In 1985, N. Koblitz and V. Miller first suggested Elliptic curve cryptography which is based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves over finite fields [10] . The ECC comes under the category Abelian group [11] and the keys used in ECC are generally logarithmic values, so it cannot be easier to retrieve the key [35] . Hence ECC provides more security than RSA with smaller key size. As the keys size is very small, processing overheads are automatically reduced [12] . The Key size for 160 bit ECC system provides security strength comparable to a 1024 bits RSA cryptosystem [21, 33, 34] .
Elliptic curves are not ellipses. Let p be an odd prime, p > 3 [12] . The irreducible polynomial for elliptic curve E defined over GF(p) with x1, y1, K and L  GF(p) and 4K3 +27L2 ≠0 (mod p) which is given in the next Equation is used in the proposed work: 
Then the shared key generated by both the end having equal value is given in the equation
Proposed session key agreement protocol
Bio-Cryptography is an upcoming powerful solution which can be integrated with the advantages of conventional cryptography and biometrics [13] . Hence, to improve the security of the proposed session key agreement protocol, the G point derived from the iris biometrics is used in the conventional elliptic curve cryptography [14, 31] . The security of the proposed scheme is based on public key cryptosystem, discrete logarithm and biometrics [15] . In the proposed session key agreement protocol elliptic curve parameters like A, B, and G point are derived from the iris signature of the e-Passport holder. From the derived G point shared secret session key k between client and server is generated. Here e-Passport is acting as a client and Examination System (ES) is a server which is available at the airport in the country visited by the e-Passport holder. The proposed method has three phases namely registration phase, session key generation phase and verification phase.
First phase: Generation of elliptic curve parameters and public key from Iris
At the time of registration to obtain an e-Passport (Smart Card), the user enrols iris in the Data Originator system of their native country. The registration phase from this phase the iris code of the user and elliptic curve parameters are generated from the iris are shown in Fig. 1 . Step 1. User enrols his/her iris to the Data Originator System (DOS) during the registration phase.
Step 2. From the enrolled iris, 160 unique iris signature is generated by the Daugman recommended method [16] , and ECC parameters as explained in Fig. 2 .
Step 3. Then the Data originator system stores the value of A, B, G and conventional parameters like age, gender, name, etc., in its database as well as in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) of e-Passport (Smart Card).
Step 4. The smart card is then handed over to the user. The pre-processing stages of iris from which the keys derived by the data originator system is shown in Fig. 2 .
The first stage is image acquisition and this is followed by iris segmentation which isolates the iris region in a digital eye image. This process comprises of identifying the inner and outer borders of the iris. In order to balance the differences in the image capturing distances and in the size of the pupil, it is common to change the segmented iris area into a fixed length and dimensionless polar coordinate system. It is usually done using a method proposed by D a u g m a n [16] , which is the third stage of the process known as normalization. From the normalized eye image using 1D Gabor filters 9600 bits iris code is extracted. From the 9600 bits of biometric template, 160 unique digest bits are obtained using SHA-1 algorithm, [17, 18, 30] from which ECC parameters A and B are derived. Then Using ECC algorithm ECC points are generated from which the point G is arbitrarily chosen. In the proposed method 600 iris images are taken from MMU1 public database. The results of first phase details are shown in the Table 1 . It is realized from the table that the A, B, G and public key value generated for each iris are unique. In this phase secured session key between e-Passport and Examination system is generated using ECC. The key is unique for each and every session. So that the intruder cannot easily retrieve the key and the information. The proposed system under consideration consists of two connected components: e-Passport (Chip) and Examination System (ES). e-Passport contains chip ID, elliptic curve parameters like A, B, G point public key and conventional parameters like age, gender, etc. The ES also has its cryptographic key values. The entire operation of the proposed protocol is shown in the Fig. 3 and the notations used in the protocol are described in Table 2 . Step 1. During the visit of e-Passport holder to foreign countries at the airport, for verification purpose e-Passport (Chip or Client) is presented to ES. After reading the MRZ information from e-Passport, ES sends Get challenge message to e-Passport. On receiving it, chip generated a nonce Nchip and computes Qchip = Nchip * G; G is retrieved from e-Passport.
Step 2. Digital signature of Qchip value is calculated. This signature is encrypted using the public key of the Examination system. Then the message Qchip, G, Epub(DSG(Qchip)) values are sent to the Examination system. To prevent man in the middle attack digital signature concept is used in the proposed method.
Step 3. On receiving message 1 from e-Passport, ES generates a nonce NES and calculates QES = NES*G. Then it computes the shared key K = Qchip*NES.
Step 4. Digital signature of QES value is calculated. This signature is encrypted using the public key of the Examination system. Then the message Qchip, Epub(DSG(Qchip)), SYMK(Data) values are sent to the Examination system.
Third part of the message contains data which is to be transmitted from Examination system to e-Passport in a secure way. Before transmission the information is first converted into cipher text using AES algorithm where the key value used is the generated k value. To add more security in the transmission again the information is encrypted using a public key of e-Passport.
Step 5. On receiving the message from the ES, e-Passport calculates the shared secret key K by using the equation K = QES*Nchip and decrypts the information. Table 3 shows the results of shared session key generated between client and server for two sessions. It is realized from Table 3 , that the session key generated for the two sessions are different and unique for each e-Passport.
Validation of session key agreement protocol using ProVerif
ProVerif is an efficient cryptographic protocol verifier based on Pi calculus [6] . This tool is used to verify authenticity and strong secrecy properties of various cryptographic protocols [7] . It can handle an unbounded number of sessions of the protocol. In ProVerif, the adversary has power over the system by vigorously monitoring communication channels and ability to capture, modify, send, or resend messages. ProVerif provides a trace of the intruder's attack if the protocol has a security problem. Figure 4 shows the structure of the ProVerif.
Structure of the ProVerif
The structure of the ProVerif is shown in Fig. 4 .
ProVerif takes as input a model of protocol in the form of Pi calculus plus cryptography along with the security properties the user wants to prove. The tool automatically translates the protocol into horn clauses and security properties [8, 9] to derivable queries on these clauses. Clauses represent the computational abilities of the attacker and the messages of the protocol. ProVerif uses an algorithm based resolution to check the fact whether it is derivable from the horn clauses. Facts represent the initial knowledge possessed by an attacker. If the fact is not derivable this means that there is no attack, otherwise there is a possibility of attack by the adversary. In the proposed method Proverif tool is used for formal modelling, since ProVerif is performed automatically, and the errors can be easily detected [38, 39] . 
Formal modeling using ProVerif
The proposed protocol is modeled, based on the message sequence shown in Fig. 4 using ProVerif [19, 20, 32] . The ProVerif code consists of signature, equational theory for symmetric encryption, asymmetric encryption, proposed ECC operation, main processes, e-Passport process, and ES processes.
The formal modelling of the proposed protocol was verified using ProVerif .The formal modelling consists of 3 process namely Main Process, e-Passport Process and ES (Examination System process).
Main process
In the main process public key for the e-Passport and ES along with the signed public key for the e-Passport is created and transmitted via the public channel. The processes are modeled that they can run in any order and at any time. The ProVerif code for the main process is: (* message 1 is transmitted via channel c*) event acceptsEchip (sekey); in(c, (m: bitstring, n: bitstring)); (* received QES and secret message encrypted using shared secrecy *) let Qes= bitstring_to_eccpoint (n) in let (= sekey) = shkey (Qes, nchip) in (* computes the same key using the received QES*) let (= s) = adec (sdec (m, sekey), schip) in (* decrypts the message m using shared key*) event termEchip (sekey, pkchip).
ES processes
In this process nonce NES is created and QES value is computed. Then message senc(s, sekey) ), pchip), eccpoint_to_bitstring (Qes))); (* transmit the secret message s and Qes*) event termES (sekey).
Result analysis
The security goals like secrecy, authentication and data integrity between e-Passport to ES and ES to e-Passport are analysed using this formal modal. To verify the secrecy of message s and shared key k the following attacker model is used in the program code. query attacker(s). query attacker(sekey).
To verify the authentication between the parties the following CA is used in the program code. query x: key,y:spkey; event(termEchip(x,y))event(acceptsES(x,y)). query x: key; inj-event (termES(x))inj-event(acceptsEchip(x)).
The output of the model is: --Query inj-event (termES (x_29))  inj-event (acceptsEchip (x_29)) Completing… Starting query inj-event (termES (x_29))  inj-event (acceptsEchip (x_29)) RESULT inj-event (termES (x_29))  inj-event (acceptsEchip (x_29)) is true.
--Query event (termEchip (x_189,y_190))  event(acceptsES(x_189,y_190)) Completing… Starting query event (termEchip (x_189,y_190))  event(acceptsES(x_189,y_190))
RESULT event (termEchip (x_189, y_190))  event (acceptsES (x_189,y_190)) is true.
- 
Security goals of the proposed protocol
It is proved from the output results, that the proposed method satisfies the following security goals. Secrecy: The value s is known only by e-Passport and ES.
Authentication of e-Passport to ES: If ES reaches the end of the protocol, it believes that it has shared the secret key K with e-Passport and e-Passport was its interlocutor.
Authentication of ES to e-Passport: If e-Passport reaches the end of the protocol with shared secret key K it is believed that the key is proposed by ES for use by e-Passport for that session. Comm. cost (Number of Messages) T i a n, W o n g and Z h u [22] Yes Yes Yes No 3PM +1PA+1SKD 4 W u, C h i u and C h i e u [23] No No No Yes 3PM + 1PA 2 J i a et al. [24] No No Yes Yes 4PM + 1PA 2 A b i c h a r, M h a m e d
and E l h a s s a n [25] Yes Yes Yes No 2PM + 2PA +1MM 3 Y a n g and C h a n g [26] Yes Yes No No 3PM + 2PA 2 D e b i a o, C h e n and Z h a n g [28] From the results in Table 4 , it is inferred that the proposed protocol satisfies the following properties like mutual authentication between the two communication parties, supports key agreement protocol, certificate computations are not required. Computational cost and number of communication messages are less when compared to existing schemes except the scheme proposed by Yang & Chang. Henceforth, the security properties of the proposed scheme are compared with Yang & Chang (2009) scheme and the result is listed in the Table 5 . It infers from Table 5 , that the proposed scheme provides forward security along with the other security properties listed. Hence the proposed scheme is more secure when compared to YC scheme.
Conclusion
In the proposed method ECC parameters A and B are derived from the Iris Signature. By passing these parameters to the ECC algorithm ECC points are generated. From these points G point is chosen arbitrarily. This G point is used to generate a shared secure key between e-Passport and the ES. Then the formal analysis of key agreement protocol is modeled using automatic protocol verification tool ProVerif. The three security properties of the protocol namely security, authentication between e-Passport to ES and vice versa are encoded in the model. The positive results from the output convey that the intended properties of the protocol hold good. Since the same key is used, privacy of the e-Passport data also hold good. The e-Passport leaked the confidential data only to the ES and not to other adversaries.
